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CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION WITHIN THE
CARICOM FRAMEWORK: THE SOCIO-
HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF A REGIONAL RESPONSE
TO A GLOBAL PHENOMENON
Christopher P. Malcolm t
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established under
the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. CARICOM was established
to foster greater cooperation among Caribbean states, and it has
been the main vehicle through which recent attempts at economic inte-
gration of the commonwealth Caribbean have been pursued. Although
CARICOM was not established to achieve a political union, it has the
capacity to engender greater political cooperation among CARICOM
Member States.'
In and of itself, greater political cooperation is desirable; however,
some fear that further integration will inevitably result in a backdoor
means of achieving a political federation under the guise of CARICOM.
It is not surprising, therefore, that those opposed to a political union
within the commonwealth Caribbean have been sceptical about
CARICOM. 2
CARICOM is one of several Caribbean institutions and is also one of
several attempts made to integrate the commonwealth Caribbean. 3 At
present, there are several socio-historical and other factors which militate
against Caribbean integration. However, there are significant considera-
tions within and without CARICOM, which support, if not dictate, fur-
ther Caribbean integration. Within CARICOM, the establishment of the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the Caribbean
t Christopher P. Malcolm, Attorney-at-Law, Cowan Dunkley Cowan, 4 Latham Av-
enue, Kingston 10 Jamaica West Indies. This article is dedicated to Maria.
1. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, July 4, 1973, art. 6, available at http://www.car-
icom.org/archives/revisedtreaty.pdf [hereinafter Revised Treaty].
2. See generally WEST INDIAN COMMISSION. TIME FOR AcTION: THE REPORT OF THE
WEST INDIAN COMMISSION: A SYNOPSIS (Black Rock 1992).
3. The institutions include the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the West
Indies Cricket Team; the integration efforts have included the British West Indies
Federation (Federation), the West Indies Associated States (WIAS), and the Or-
ganisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
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Court of Justice (CCJ) are indicative of the desire for further Caribbean
integration. 4 Without CARICOM, the imminent establishment of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),5 the deepening integration
within the European Union (EU), the economic impact of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), and the overreaching realities of globalisa-
tion6 suggest that a deeper level of integration within CARICOM is nec-
essary and should be pursued apace.
Regional integration involves myriad considerations. Insofar as inte-
gration within CARICOM is concerned, the socio-historical realities of
colonialism are critical. British colonialism evidenced the first instance of
integration in the commonwealth Caribbean.7 Colonialism is also histori-
cally linked to the current level of disintegration within the region; 8 thus,
an examination of Caribbean integration should involve adequate refer-
ence to the impact of colonialism. This article will not exhaustively ex-
plore the historical underpinnings of colonialism; instead, it will examine
aspects of the political, judicial, and economic realities of the past and
present attempts, including colonialism, to integrate the Caribbean. It
will also include recommendations for further integration within the
CARICOM framework.
Although the commonwealth Caribbean will be in focus, CARICOM
includes Member States that are not a part of this historical grouping.9
Notwithstanding the apparent limitation in scope, the central questions
related to regional integration within the CARICOM framework apply to
all Member States with equal force. Thus, the recommendations set out
in section IV are intended for the benefit of CARICOM Member States,
whether they are within or without the commonwealth Caribbean.
Section II will examine the socio-historical realities that led to the es-
tablishment of CARICOM; section III will examine the impact of exter-
nalities on CARICOM; section IV will include recommendations for
further integration within CARICOM; and section V will conclude the
aiticle.
4. The CSME will commence operations among Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica in
2004 and should be extended to all contracting parties in 2005.
5. The timetable for the FTAA indicates that it should be realised in 2005. However,
current political and other factors suggest that this timetable may be unrealistic.
6. See Vijay Govindarajan & Anil Gupta, MASTERING GLOBAL BUSINESS (London:
Financial Times Prentice Hall 1988). Globalisation is there defined as, "the grow-
ing economic interdependence among countries as reflected in increasing cross-
border flows of goods, services, capital and know-how."
7. Insofar as Britain was concerned the Caribbean represented a single region under
her control.
8, See Williams, infra note 10.





Since 1492, Europe has had a critical level of involvement in the Carib-
bean region. Slavery and colonialism were at the heart of Europe's pres-
ence in the Caribbean and the main imperial powers were Britain, Spain,
and France. A detailed examination of the colonial governance structure
is beyond the scope of this article. However, on the evidence the political
and institutional arrangements in each Caribbean territory betrayed a
close resemblance to those that existed in its imperial power. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the colonial legacy inherited by the common-
wealth Caribbean includes a Westminster parliamentary model and a
common law, judicial system
B. BRITISH COLONIALISM
Reduced to essentials, British colonialism evidenced an organisation or
non-organisation of Caribbean states for the economic welfare of Brit-
ain. 10 A detailed examination of British colonialism is beyond the scope
of this paper; however, the political, legal, and economic realities of
colonialism, insofar as they impact the question of Caribbean integration,
will be considered.
1. Political
Under the Westminster parliamentary model, there are three arms of
government: the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary. Of the
three, the Executive and the Legislative are political. Executive authority
is vested in Her Majesty, the Queen of England1 1 and Parliament per-
forms the legislative functions.1 2 Her Majesty is a recognised Member of
Parliament1 3 and appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal lie with
her.14 In essence, Her Majesty is clothed with enormous constitutional
powers and the balance of power even if she does not exercise it, resides
in her, not in the elected representatives of the people.
British West Indian colonialism, inter alia, entrenched the British Mon-
arch as the head of state and a Westminster parliamentary model. The
system of governance was carefully organised so that the territorial lead-
ership reported and was directly accountable to Britain. Further, under
British colonialism the democratic rights of the people were curtailed
and, in Jamaica, for example, universal adult suffrage was not granted
until 1944. Although a detailed examination of British colonialism evi-
dences instances of procedural and other structural changes in govern-
10. See generally Eric Williams, FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO: THE HISTORY OF THE
CARIBBEAN 1492-1969 (London: Andre Deutsch Limited 1970).
11. JAM. CONST. § 68(1) (Order in Council 1962), available at http://www.georgetown.
edu/pdba/Constitutions/Jamaica/am62.html.
12. Id. § 3.
13. Id. § 34.
14. Id. § 110.
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ance, the constitutional power of the Monarch as head of state remained
intact throughout, and English, more so than local circumstances, deter-
mined the scope and effectiveness of Caribbean politics. 15
The constitutional head of state in most commonwealth Caribbean
countries is the Queen of England. She is represented by a local gover-
nor general whose jurisdiction reflects her constitutional authority, and
the conduct of parliamentary and other political proceedings bear signifi-
cant resemblance to how those proceedings are conducted in England. 16
Within CARICOM, as a whole, the political landscape reflects greater
diversity; however, notwithstanding, or perhaps as a result of the socio-
historical legacy of colonialism, the concepts of political independence
and self determination among Member States is fiercely guarded, and this
could impede the value and significance of CARICOM.
2. Judicial
The judicial systems in the commonwealth Caribbean involved, and
with the exception of Guyana still involve, a hierarchy with the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) at the apex. Although the cur-
rent legal system in Guyana evidences aspects of Romano-Dutch law and
that in St. Lucia evidences aspects of the French Civil law, the dominant
legal system in the commonwealth Caribbean is the common law. Fur-
ther, the organisation and administration of the courts, the method of
advocacy, the training of legal practitioners, and the legislation in force
betray an unmistakable link to the English legal system and the era of
colonialism. 17
A detailed examination of the judicial systems which obtained under
British West Indian colonialism, is beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, the current four tiered system in most commonwealth Caribbean
jurisdictions, which includes a Magistrates' Court, a High/Supreme Court,
a Court of Appeal, and the JCPC, is a remnant of the colonial judicial
system. Interestingly, although Guyana no longer allows appeals to the
JCPC, its three tiered system betrays the significant impact of the judicial
system which developed under British West Indian colonialism. 18
In general, the legal systems in the commonwealth Caribbean and the
jurisprudence on which they rely are an unequivocal statement of indebt-
edness to the English legal tradition. It is not surprising, therefore, that
Caribbean judges often treat decisions of the House of Lords and the
English Court of Appeal as binding, although such decisions, stricto
senso, are merely persuasive authority. 19
15. See Williams, supra note 10.
16. Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Dominica are republics and the Queen of En-
gland is not maintained as the head of state under their constitutions.
17. See generally Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND
LEGAL SYSTEMS (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 1999).
18. Id.
19. See King v. R [1968] 12 W.I.R. 268.
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The homogeneity of the legal systems in the commonwealth Caribbean,
which is a remnant of British colonialism, is positive for regional integra-
tion. Homogeneity, inter alia, enables a more seamless harmonisation of
legislation and judicial proceedings than in circumstances where
harmonisation is required across distinct legal systems. Within CAR-
ICOM, as a whole, harmonisation is more problematic as the several ju-
risdictions of CARICOM evidence both common law and civil law legal
systems. Further, within the civil law legal systems, some jurisdictions
within CARICOM have been influenced by the French civil law, others
by the Spanish civil law, and yet others by the Dutch civil law. 20 The
juridical challenges to harmonisation are not insurmountable; in the ab-
sence of an unequivocal commitment to harmonisation, however, those
challenges could impede the growth and development of CARICOM.
3. Economic
The economic arrangements established under British colonialism
served the primary interest of England.2 1 Notwithstanding the objective
of colonial economic arrangements, the trade and investments regime in
the commonwealth Caribbean evidences a debt to the era of colonialism.
In the financial sector, for example, British banks, particularly the Bar-
clays Bank, and British banking practices have had a significant impact
on the economic arrangements in CARICOM. In the circumstances, it is
not surprising that the Bank of Jamaica, for example, which was estab-
lished as the central bank of Jamaica in 1960 was modelled on the Bank
of England.
The plantation was at the heart of colonialism; hence, under colonial-
ism, the primary economic arrangements were in furtherance of property
rights. These arrangements, for example, included the establishment of
departments for the collection of stamp duty and transfer tax.22 Planta-
tion economics also required the existence and maintenance of a reliable
market. England was the primary market for the commodities produced
in the commonwealth Caribbean and she maintained that capacity even
after the demise of British West Indian colonialism. 23
C. FEDERATION
The idea of a Federation of British West Indian Colonies [the Federa-
tion] was mooted at the Conference of Roseau in 1932. In the succeeding
years, 1932-1947, the Federation idea remained current and, in 1947, the
Conference of Montego Bay mandated its establishment. Notwithstand-
20. See generally Antoine, supra note 17.
21. See Williams, supra note 10.
22. Departments such as those for the collection of stamp duties and transfer tax,
which were established under British colonialism, are still relied upon in the com-
monwealth Caribbean.
23. Trade relations with the UK were maintained on a preferential basis under the
Lome / ACP arrangements. Those arrangements have since been superseded by
the Cotonou partnership between the EU and the ACP countries.
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ing the 1947 mandate, there was a considerable implementation lag, and
the Federation agreed upon was not realised until 1958.24
The Federation was established under a British initiative. From a Brit-
ish perspective, the objectives were administrative efficiency and central-
isation; the West Indian territories on the other hand, were interested in
political independence.2 5 The Federation structure included the estab-
lishment of a British West Indies Parliament and a Federal Supreme
Court. The idea of a free trade area within the commonwealth Caribbean
was mooted and. the establishment of CARICOM was conceptualised
under the Federation.2 6
Although the Federation was intended as a political union, it never
gained the unequivocal support of the leading Caribbean politicians. In-
deed, leading political luminaries, such as Norman Manley, Alexander
Bustamante, and Eric Williams refused to contest the federal elections.
Given the lack of political support, the federal structures were weak and
disintegration and collapse was inevitable. 27
In the end, the Federation was short-lived, lasting from 1958-1962 and
it is difficult to evaluate its performance. It appears, however, that the
overriding question of nationalism among individual countries, inter-
preted by some commentators as political and jurisdictional insularity,
rendered performance difficult. The question of nationalism highlighted,
inter alia, rival political conceptions which have been blamed for the dis-
integration and eventual collapse of the Federation.28
Notwithstanding the failure of the Federation, the current dynamics of
regional integration betray reliance, and in some instances dependence,
on the ideas and institutions that were proposed and developed under it.
The existence, inter alia, of CARICOM, the CCJ, the UWI, and the pro-
posed customs union indicate the positive impact of the Federation. Fur-
ther, although regional leaders distance themselves from the idea of a
political union, the establishment and maintenance of CARICOM indi-
cates and requires the existence of a quazi-political union.
D. CARICOM
The disintegration and collapse of the Federation did not herald an un-
willingness to enter into regional trade and investment arrangements.
The leaders of the Caribbean recognised the need for closer cooperation
in external trade and investments negotiations, and this led, inter alia, to
24. See Leonard Tim Hector, Fan the Flame, available at http://www.candw.ag/
-jardinea/ffhtm/ff970704.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
25. Caribbean Islands: The West Indies Federation, 1957-62, available at http://www.
workmall.com/wfb200l/caribbeanislands/carib-
beanislandshistory.the.westindiesfederation_1957_62.html (last visited Sept.
2003) [hereinafter Caribbean Islands].
26. See History of Caricom, available at http://www.caricom.org (last visited Sept.
2003) [hereinafter History of Caricom].
27. See Caribbean Islands, supra note 25.
28. See Williams, supra note 10, at 508.
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the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)
in 1965. It was agreed that CARIFTA would signal the beginning of what
would become a Caribbean Common Market and in 1972, the Seventh
Caribbean Heads of Government Conference agreed to transform
CARIFTA into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).2 9
CARICOM was established under the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973.
The objectives of CARICOM are: the sustainable economic development
of Member States, cooperation in foreign relations, and functional coop-
eration in the provision of regional services and activities. 30 The attain-
ment of those objectives has required, inter alia, the establishment and
maintenance of a bureaucratic structure with a Conference of Heads of
Government (CHG) at the apex. 31
An analysis of the organisational structure of CARICOM and its stated
objectives indicate support for CARICOM as a quazi-political institution.
The objectives require, inter alia, harmonised, if not joint, policy decisions
on questions regarding international trade and investments negotiations,
regional customs and tariffs regimes, free movement of labour within
CARICOM, and the establishment of the CCJ. Semantics aside, those
initiatives would be stillborn without concession of political authority by
individual countries. Further, concession of political authority on those
questions infers the existence of a quazi-political union.
CARICOM is an ongoing initiative and its growth and development
should continually reflect the socio-historical, political, and economic re-
alities of domestic, regional, and international affairs. Its organisational
structure provides for the establishment and maintenance of a Bureau of
the Conference, which is required, inter alia, to initiate proposals, update
consensus, and secure implementation of CARICOM decisions in an ex-
peditious and informed manner. Consequently, CARICOM has the in-
herent capacity to coordinate a regional regime on international trade
and investments arrangements in a pro-active manner.3 2
Notwithstanding the lapse of thirty years since its establishment, CAR-
ICOM has failed to sufficiently capture the grassroots support in the com-
monwealth Caribbean. In essence, CARICOM represents a political and
intellectual initiative about which the people have not been sufficiently
informed; thus, the support and involvement of the common man is lim-
ited due to his general lack of awareness. 33 Consequently, its growth and
development has been subject to the whims and fancy of politicians, and
it can, as was the ill-fated British West Indies Federation be an object for
29. See History of Caricom, supra note 26.
30. Revised Treaty, supra note 1, Preamble.
31. Revised Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12.
32. Revised Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
33. See Winston Dookeran, Address delivered at Conference on Caribbean Public and
Private Financial Sector Collaboration on the Impact of the Euro on the Regional
Trade and Monetary Policy (Oct. 8, 1999), available at http://www.central -bank.
org.tt/communications/speeches/sp991008.pdf.
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partisan political gain.34
Although CARICOM suffers, inter alia, inadequate public relations
machinery, it is the pre-eminent regional integration initiative within the
commonwealth Caribbean. In recent years external events such as the
imminent establishment of the FTAA, the establishment of the WTO,
and the increasing significance of globalisation have resulted in a more
purposeful and proactive CARICOM. The Council for Trade and Eco-
nomic Development (COTED) is a principal organ of CARICOM.
COTED is an organ of CARICOM, which is of particular significance in
the establishment and maintenance of a regional trade and investments
regime. Insofar as trade and investments is concerned, the most signifi-
cant achievements of CARICOM are the establishment of the Regional
Negotiating Machinery (RNM), the establishment of the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), if only in its original jurisdiction, and the immi-
nent establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy
(CSME). 35
1. RNM
The RNM was established to further an overall CARICOM strategy
for the development, coordination, and execution of external trade-re-
lated negotiations. Thus, the core functions of the RNM are to: advise,
coordinate, facilitate, and negotiate. In essence, the RNM is a primary
catalyst in the creation of an enabling environment through which the
region is able to maximise the benefits available from trade in the global
market.36 Consequently, the RNM should ensure that the sustainable de-
velopment of CARICOM is not impeded by the challenges of global
trade arrangements.
At present, the RNM is involved, inter alia, in negotiations under the
WTO Doha Development Agenda, in devising an Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) between the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries and the European Union (EU) and in FTAA negotiations. It is
also involved in bilateral negotiations, which includes CARICOM, such
as CARICOM-Canada, CARICOM-Venezuela, and CARICOM-Costa
Rica.3 7
The financial and other resources of the RNM are not unlimited; in-
deed, the RNM suffers the fate of several regional institutions-lack of
adequate funding. Notwithstanding the financial and other constraints,
the RNM has taken a pro-active approach to trade and investments nego-
34. See Micheal Burke, Federation and History, THE JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 17,
2003, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns (last visited Sept.
2003).
35. The RNM was established in 1997, the CCJ could become operational in mid to
late 2004, and the CSME should be realised in 2005.
36. Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, About the RNM, available at http://
www.crnm.org/about the rnm.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
37. Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, Negotiating Theatres, available at
http://www.crnm.org/negotiating-theatres.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
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tiations. It has, for example, commissioned studies, which deal, inter alia,
with the impact of biodiversity in CARICOM trade negotiations, the im-
plications of EU enlargement for CARICOM, and the policy implications
of size.38 It has also sponsored a professional training programme which
is aimed at enhancing the region's trade negotiation machinery. 39 Those
initiatives should inure to the greater benefit of CARICOM, and they
indicate the intention of the RNM to prepare the region adequately for
the challenges of global trade and investments negotiations.
2. CSME
The Conference of Heads of Government passed revisions to the
Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1989 enabling the establishment of the Carib-
bean Single Market and Economy (CSME). Since 1989, a number of pro-
tocols have been developed and approved as pre-requisites to its
establishment and maintenance. Contrary to popular belief, the CSME
infers more than the existence of a common market; it speaks to a single
economy, thus, the arrangements within it transcend the question of cus-
toms and tariffs-require unequivocal political cooperation and the exis-
tence of a supra-regional political authority.40
Although the possibility of free market access within CARICOM is sig-
nificant to Member States, the opportunities of the CSME transcend in-
tra-regional trade; thus, the debates around the CSME, insofar as they
focus on intra-regional trade, are limited in scope. A properly developed
and coordinated CSME should make the region, inter alia, more attrac-
tive to foreign investors, and should facilitate easier and more beneficial
access for regional entrepreneurs who are interested in the international
markets.41
3. Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty is critical to the existence of individual
countries. However, the concept is understood not by reference to a pre-
cise definition but on recognition of particular incidents, such as self-gov-
ernance and the capacity to gain acceptance as a sovereign state in the
international community. The incidents of sovereignty are not set in
stone, and the concept, as it is now understood, varies significantly from
how it would have been understood in 1962. In the area of commercial
activity, for example, the modern trend recognises that a sovereign state
38. Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, Documents and Studies, available at
http://www.crnm.org/documents.&_studies.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
39. Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery, RNM Update of January 23, 2001,
available at http://www.crnm.org (last visited Sept. 2003).
40. See Havelock R. Brewster, The Caribbean Single Market and Economy: Is it Real-
istic without Commitment to Political Unity? Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://
www.uwichill.edu.bb.
41. See Richard Bernal, The Role of the Single Market and Economy in Preparing
CARICOM for the Challenges of Globalization, available at http://www.thebriefing
room.net/R-Bernal.pdf (last visited Sept. 2003).
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that enters the market is subject to the rules of dispute settlement, which
are applicable in that market.42 Further, various multi-national and bilat-
eral treaties require sovereign states to treat persons from other states in
a manner that is no less favourable than how nationals are treated.43
Within CARICOM, the question of sovereignty bears particular signifi-
cance to individual countries. The pre-occupation, even to the point of
jurisdictional insularity, some may argue is best explained by reference to
the socio-historical realities of the region. In relative political terms, the
countries of the commonwealth Caribbean are young and they all have a
shared history of slavery and colonialism. 44 It is not surprising, therefore,
that most persons in the commonwealth Caribbean are unwilling to sacri-
fice their democratic right to political independence and self-determina-
tion. Unfortunately, sovereignty to the point of jurisdictional insularity is
regressive and unsuitable within a common economic area.
Within a regional framework, strict adherence to the doctrine of politi-
cal independence and self-determination could result in unnecessary, if
not unintended, trade and investment barriers. Thus, if economic integra-
tion is the objective, Caribbean states must be prepared to concede as-
pects of their political independence for the good of the region. Among
other powers, the political directorate of every sovereign state is
authorised to determine and apply internal financial regulations without
reference to other states; however, if financial regulations within a com-
mon economic area, such as the CSME, vary from country to country, the
distinctions that result could create non-tariff trade barriers, which would
impede intra-regional trade and financial activity. 45
The CARICOM framework recognises, inter alia, the need for legisla-
tive harmonisation and the concession of political authority to the CHG
by individual countries. 46 It is surprising, therefore, that many of those
who support CARICOM are adamant that CARICOM should not in-
volve a political union. Given the socio-historical realities of the com-
monwealth Caribbean and the history of the short-lived British West
Indies Federation, the opposition to a political union is understood.
However, the CARICOM framework requires a quazi-political, if not a
full political union; therefore, the question is not whether but how to
maintain and, if necessary, broaden the political union which exists within
CARICOM.
42. Kuwaiti Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [19951 IWLR 1147, 1171, (HL), per
Lord Mustill.
43. Revised Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7.
44. British West Indian slaves were emancipated on August 1, 1838, and Jamaica,
which was the first West Indian Territory to obtain political independence from
England, became an independent country on August 6, 1962.
45. Professor Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, in a lecture given at Queen Mary Uni-
versity of London on Friday June 14, 2003, posited that, "uneven regulations in the
global financial markets are a hindrance to trade in financial goods and services. In
effect, the uneven regulations are non-tariff trade barriers."
46. Revised Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12.
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4. CCJ
At present, the most controversial issue within CARICOM is the es-
tablishment of the CCJ. The CCJ was conceived as a final appellate court
for the countries of the commonwealth Caribbean. However, the agree-
ment establishing the court provides that it will serve in its original juris-
diction as an invaluable operational component of the CSME.47 The
rationale, at least on the surface, for the original jurisdiction of the CCJ is
that the CSME requires a predictable and cost effective mechanism for
dispute settlement. In this vein, those in support of the CCJ argue that it
would be an ideal dispute settlement mechanism for the CSME; thus, al-
though the CCJ was not initially conceived as a trade and investment
dispute settlement mechanism, it will accommodate this objective.
Notwithstanding the provision for trade and disputes settlement under
the CCJ, it has been labelled a 'hanging court.' This criticism, justifiable
or not, has its supporters and some commentators argue that the CCJ will
effectively deny the people of the commonwealth Caribbean a superior
quality of justice which is now provided by the JCPC. On the evidence,
local courts are under-funded and in many instances under-staffed. Fur-
ther, the fate of regional institutions, such as the UWI, questions the
preparedness and capacity of the region to adequately maintain the CCJ.
It has also been argued that there is a real possibility that there will be
political interference in both the appointment of judges and in the opera-
tion of the CCJ.48
The arguments against the CCJ do not present a complete picture;
however, a detailed examination of the arguments for and against its es-
tablishment is beyond the scope of this article. It appears that the con-
cerns, important as they are, are logistic in nature and do not justify an
unwillingness to consider and ultimately support the establishment and
maintenance of the CCJ. Insofar as the trade and investment jurisdiction
of the CCJ is concerned, the question is whether an alternative dispute
settlement mechanism, such as ICSID arbitration under the Washington
Convention or the Additional Facility Rules, could not be relied upon by
the CSME.
a. Jurisprudence
The development of a truly Caribbean jurisprudence is the most attrac-
tive feature of the CCJ. Like every other region, the Caribbean is unique
and a jurisprudence of its own will entrench and sustain the sovereign
aspirations and self-determination of the Caribbean people. It will, inter
alia enable decision making that is informed by local circumstances. Fur-
47. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, part I1, (as amended on
July 10, 2000), available at http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreement-ccj.htm
[hereinafter Agreement].
48. Bernice V. Lake, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Public Confidence and the Role
of the Media, Address at The Fifth Annual Caribbean Media Conference (May 16,
2002), available at http://www.caricom.org/archives/ccj-lake.pdf.
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ther, although trade and investment is an international phenomenon,
trade usage and custom within the Caribbean has been influenced by the
socio-historical realities of the region; thus, the development of a predict-
able trade and investment framework under the CSME requires the es-
tablishment and maintenance of a dispute settlement mechanism that
understands the socio-historical realities of the Caribbean.
A Caribbean jurisprudence does not imply an insular or inward looking
jurisprudence. Indeed, the agreement establishing the CCJ recognises
that the judges can be chosen from any of the several jurisdictions of the
commonwealth.49 Further, insofar as the trade and investment jurisdic-
tion of the CCJ is concerned, the judges are empowered to apply princi-
ples of international law.5 0 In any event, at common law there is an
established doctrine of persuasive precedent that would enable judges of
the CCJ to apply legal decisions from other jurisdictions. Consequently,
a regional jurisprudence should not result in a diminished source of jurid-
ical reference and the personal integrity of judges, drawn from within and
without the Caribbean, together with the protective watch of the various
Caribbean bar associations and other interest groups should result in the
desired quality of justice.
b. ICSID
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) was established under the Washington Convention in 1965. The
ICSID, sponsored by the World Bank, was established, inter alia, to facili-
tate the settlement of investment disputes between contracting states and
nationals of contracting states. 51 Article 53 of the Convention excludes
the application of national laws; thus, an award of ICSID arbitrators is
binding on the parties in the proceedings and is not subject to appeal or
any other remedies, except those provided in the Convention.
The administrative capacity of the ICSID was broadened under the
Additional Facility Rules. Those rules, inter alia, enable the ICSID Sec-
retariat to administer the settlement of disputes where one of the parties
is not a state or national of a contracting state.52 Proceedings under the
Additional Facility Rules are not governed by the Washington Conven-
tion; thus, the dispute which is subject to Additional Facility proceedings
need not involve an investment in the sense of the Convention but it must
involve a transaction which by the intention of the parties, its duration or
importance goes beyond an ordinary commercial contract. The enforce-
ment mechanism under the Convention is not available in Additional Fa-
cility proceedings. Consequently, those proceedings must depend on
49. Agreement, supra note 47, art. IV(9).
50. Agreement, supra note 47, art. IX(g).
51. Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, preamble and art. 1, available at http:/
/www.asser.nl/ica/washen.htm.
52. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Jan. 1, 2003, art. 2, available at http://www.world
bank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm.
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national laws for their efficacy and awards qualify for recognition and
enforcement under the New York Convention.53
The ICSID facility 54 is an internationally recognised method of dispute
settlement. The Additional Facility Rules, for example, have become
very important in recent years and arbitration there is the preferred
method for the settlement of investment disputes within NAFTA. The
proposals for the settlement of investment disputes under the FTAA also
prefer arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules.55 Preference for
the ICSID facility is not only a convenient alternative, most importantly,
preference avoids the uncertainty that could result if a specialist court
was set up to deal with trans-national disputes without the unequivocal
political support of all interested parties. In the context of CARICOM, if
the parties agree and the necessary contracts are entered into, the ICSID
facility could be relied upon for the settlement of disputes under the
CSME. Although the possibility exists, the facility may not provide an
optimum, or even a satisfactory method for the settlement of disputes
under the CSME.
The ICSID facility is a commercial arrangement and it does not rely on,
nor does it facilitate economic or political integration. Accordingly, those
who argue in support of a 'private sector driven' economic integration
within CARICOM have no basis on which to oppose dispute settlement
under the ICSID facility. It appears, however, that the ICSID facility
cannot or should not be relied on as a stand-alone facility where dispute
settlement within a regional economic area is contemplated. Under
NAFTA for example, interpretation of the NAFTA, as distinct from the
arbitration agreement, is without the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. 56
Similarly, even if arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules is pre-
ferred under the CSME, it may be necessary to rely on an internal CSME
/ CARICOM mechanism to interpret the Treaty of Chaguaramas and the
protocols that establish and control the CSME.
In the final analysis, CARICOM is more than a trade and investments
vehicle; it is a quazi-political, economic arrangement, hence, it requires
an internal mechanism for the settlement of disputes under the CSME.
Accordingly, the ICSID facility and other internationally accepted dis-
pute settlement mechanisms, such as International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) arbitration or ad hoc arbitration under the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules, which do not promote economic or political integration, are un-
53. JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003), at chs. 28-117 et seq..
54. For present purposes, the ICSID facility includes arbitration under the Washington
Convention and the Additional Facility Rules.
55. See Second FTFAA Draft Agreement, Nov. 1, 2002, Chapter on Investment, draft
art. 15(7), available at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/ftaadraft02/draft-e.asp#I1.
56. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Dec. 17, 1992, 1992 WL 812384, at * 12 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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suitable for dispute settlement within the CSME. The question for re-
gional leaders, therefore, if they are committed to economic integration
within CARICOM, is not whether but how best to entrench and demon-
strate their unequivocal support for an internal dispute settlement mecha-
nism, such as the CCJ.
III. IMPACT OF EXTERNALITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The current realities of trade, investment, development, and diplomacy
would be unrecognisable to anyone interested in these areas whose refer-
ence period pre-dates 1973. Although the current realities are significant,
a detailed examination of the complex matrix of political, legal and eco-
nomic facts, which they involve, is beyond the scope of this article. In
short, among the major trade and investment participants, the conduct of
business now betrays a significant level of disciplinary interconnectedness
and jurisdictional indifference. Further, the effects of modern technology
and an increasing level of global competition require investors to produce
their goods and services in an environment that facilitates cost-effective-
ness and efficiency. 57
The change in circumstances, which distinguishes the current state of
the global market, has resulted from a combination of technological, in-
tellectual, economic, and political factors. Improvements in technology,
for example, mean that an investor can as easily conduct his business in
Jamaica from a base in Australia, as could an invester based in Jamaica
who conducts business in Jamaica. Further, as a result also of improve-
ments in technology, among other facts, it is much easier to conduct busi-
ness across traditional product and sector barriers; consequently, the
astute investor is primarily concerned with questions of economies of
scope and scale regardless of the place and manner in which his objec-
tives are realised.
In the end, the factors that influenced the disintegration of the British
West Indies Federation, may be irrelevant when the utility or viability of
CARICOM is considered. In addition, the impact or likely impact of the
FTAA, the EU, international trade and investment liberalisation, the
WTO, regional trade blocks without CARICOM, international
standardisation, and globalisation mean that the question of further Car-
ibbean integration within or without the CARICOM framework must be
given serious and unequivocal attention. The following sub-sections of
this article will examine the impact of those realities on the question of
Caribbean integration.
57. Aleem Mohammed, The Movement of Goods: Issues and Challenges for the
CSME, available at http://www.thebriefingroom.net/DrAleemMohammed.pdf
(last visited Sept. 2003).
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B. THE FTAA AND THE EU
The FTAA and the EU are critical to the trade and investments regime
in CARICOM. The FTAA, on the one hand, will become an integral
trade and investment arrangement in which CARICOM states are con-
tracting parties. The EU, on the other hand, represents an external ar-
rangement which is unlikely to involve CARICOM Member States as
contracting parties. Membership in the EU is not delimited by traditional
geographical considerations; if it were, the admission of Turkey to mem-
bership would not have been contemplated. Consequently, CARICOM
membership in the EU is not impossible; however, in all likelihood the
EU will remain an arrangement that is external to CARICOM Member
States.
The socio-historical realities of the Caribbean and the current trade
and investments arrangements that exist between the EU and CAR-
ICOM Member States suggest that even after the establishment of the
FTAA, the EU will retain a critical balance of power in the Caribbean. 58
Further, the EU represents a major international trade and investment
area; thus, it is very significant to all other participants in international
trade and investments. It also represents a commanding political pres-
ence and its impact on the process of globalisation and international
standardisation is undeniable. 59
1. FTAA
The FTAA represents an initiative within the Western Hemisphere that
should, inter alia, enable CARICOM Member States to pursue sustaina-
ble economic development through the creation of a favourable, predict-
able, transparent, and stable hemispheric climate for liberalising trade
and investment. Stricto senso, the FTAA initiative, since it will involve
the Caribbean countries as contracting parties, is not external per se.
However, it is U.S. driven and trade and investments negotiations under
it by CARICOM are best treated as negotiations for entry into an exter-
nal arrangement. In essence, the initiative is an outgrowth of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its primary concerns are
the development and strengthening of free market infrastructures, the es-
tablishment and maintenance of democratic and accountable political in-
stitutions, and adherence to the rule of law.60
The Second FTAA Draft Agreement provides that its objectives in-
clude trade liberalisation with a view to generate economic growth and
prosperity, contribution to the expansion of world trade and elimination
58. David Greenaway & Chris Milner, Implications of European Union Enlargement
for CARICOM Countries, available at http://www.crnm.org (last visited Sept.
2003).
59. The 67, which includes the most prominent members of the EU, has had the
greatest impact on the international standardisation process.
60. See JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGINO ECONO-
MIES 269 (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2000).
2004]
50 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
of barriers, restrictions, and/or unnecessary distortions to free trade
among parties. 61 The Agreement also provides, inter alia, for the better
of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) or National treatment by the host coun-
try to investors of other contracting parties. 62 Insofar as the settlement of
investments disputes between the state and investors is concerned, Draft
Article 15(7) provides for arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules or the
ICSID facility. Although the Agreement provides for settlement of dis-
putes by arbitration, the interpretation of Annexes shall be conducted by
the FTAA Commission.63
The requirement for MFN or National treatment is a standard feature
of bi-lateral and multi-lateral investments treaty arrangements. MIN or
National treatment infers fair and equitable treatment; however, in some
treaty arrangements, as will be the case under the FTAA Agreement, the
parties specifically commit to a standard of fair and equitable treat-
ment.64 The obligation to accord MFN, National, or Fair and Equitable
treatment is a contractual undertaking, the breach of which can result in
significant damages or other remedies. 65
2. EU
The EU is a quazi-political economic union.66 Since its creation, it has
entered into a succession of preferential trade arrangements. These ar-
rangements have included the post Lome Convention and the Cotonou
Agreement, which was concluded in Benin on June 23, 2000. The Coto-
nou Agreement is of particular significance to CARICOM it represents a
partnership agreement that enables African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries duty free access to the European Economic Area (EEA) on
industrial and processed agricultural imports on a non-reciprocal basis.
The Cotonou Agreement violates the provisions of Article I of the
GATT; however, a waiver has been granted until 2007, thereafter, it
could be replaced with WTO compatible trading arrangements. 67
The Cotonou Agreement indicates recognition by the EU that the
countries of the commonwealth Caribbean have special needs. Thus, it
avoids the broad brushes of an international trade and investments envi-
ronment and the trade rules that govern it have been ameliorated, albeit
as a short-term measure. The implications of size and the special needs of
61. See General Articles of the FFAA Agreement, draft art. 2, available at http://
www.alca-ftaa.org/ftaadraft02/draft-.e.asp.
62. See Chapter on Investments, draft art. 5, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
ftaadraft02/drafte.asp#IN.
63. See Chapter on Investments, draft art. 20, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/
ftaadraft02/draft_e.asp#IN.
64. See Chapter on Investments, draft art. 6, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org
ftaadraft02/draft_e.asp#IN.
65. CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, available at http://
www.mfcr.cz/static/Arbitrazien/PartialAward.doc (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
66. Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) Preamble EU Treaty (Maas-
tricht 1992), OJ. 1997 c340/149, preamble and art. 2 [hereinafter EU Treaty].
67. See Greenaway & Milner, supra note 58.
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CARICOM are significant and they are an important consideration in the
current ACP/EU post Cotonou negotiations.68 The RNM is responsible
for the current negotiations on behalf of CARICOM and it is anticipated
that the post Cotonou Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) will ad-
equately recognise those special needs.
C. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION, REGIONAL
TRADE BLOCKS, AND THE WTO
1. Global Perspective
The establishment of regional trade and investments arrangements is
an international phenomenon. The phenomenon, which involves myriad
socio-historical, economic, and political considerations, is in essence a re-
sponse to the global dominance of free market politics and economics.
More and more countries have come to recognise that in a global, even if
not a completely free market, quazi-political and economic integration is
a necessity for their survival and sustainable development. Indeed, the
phenomenon is pervasive to the extent that several countries involve
themselves in more than one trade and investments arrangement.
Within South East Asia, for example, there are two major trade and
investments arrangements. Those arrangements are the Asia-Pacific Co-
operation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Although the objectives of APEC and ASEAN are not iden-
tical, there are considerable areas of overlap, and the membership in
APEC is essentially the same as the membership in ASEAN. In Eastern
Europe, there are also a number of trade and investments arrangements.
Those arrangements include the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), and the Black Sea Eco-
nomic Cooperation (BSEC). As in South East Asia, there are considera-
ble areas of overlap in the scope and membership of those arrangements.
Insofar as the commonwealth Caribbean is concerned, the regional trade
and investments arrangements include CARICOM, the Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the FTAA.
A detailed examination of the various regional trade and investments
arrangements indicates, inter alia, the need for rationalisation and greater
cooperation. Notwithstanding these limitations, the proliferation and ap-
parent increase in the significance of regional trade and investments ar-
rangements evidences an underlying belief in their value and the positive
impact they can have on individual countries.
The WTO is the leading international institution, insofar as the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a liberalised international trade and invest-
ments regime is concerned. The WTO is an outgrowth of the General
68. Anthony Peter Gonzales, Policy Implications of Smallness as a Factor in the Lome,
FTAA and WTO Negotiations, available at http://www.crnm.org (last visited Sept.
2003).
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, the jurisdictional
scope of the WTO is broader than the jurisdiction conferred on the
GATT. Further, unlike the GATT, the WTO is a de jure international
organisation;69 consequently, through it a more predictable and interna-
tionally accepted regime is realisable. It provides, inter alia, a mechanism
for the achievement of greater coherence in global economic policy-mak-
ing, and it includes a mechanism for the settlement of trade and invest-
ments disputes.70
The question concerning regional trade blocks is whether they will or
should become redundant within the WTO regime. Although regional
trade blocks, as does the WTO, address trade and investments arrange-
ments, the existence of the WTO does not justify their abandonment.
Regional trade blocks perform an integral quazi-political role and in an
era of increasing globalisation and international standardisation, they re-
present a realistic opportunity through which small developing states can
impact the process of globalisation and international standardisation. 71
2. CARICOM Perspective
Free market politics and economics, which have led to an increase in
international trade and investment liberalisation, are of particular signifi-
cance to CARICOM. In the area of trade in financial services, for exam-
ple, NAFTA provides that each contracting party, subject to its own
national regulatory framework, should permit persons from other con-
tracting parties to establish and maintain financial institutions in its terri-
tory. 72 Within the WTO regime, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), which deals with trade in financial services, requires
contracting parties to grant MFN treatment to services and service suppli-
ers from other contracting parties. MFN treatment under the GATS is a
negotiable discipline, which applies, in the absence of limitations, to those
services and modes of supply for which specific commitments have been
undertaken. 73
A similar provision to the NAFTA provision on trade in financial ser-
vices, among other provisions, will become a part of the FTAA regime.74
Most CARICOM countries will become contracting parties under the
GATS; thus, the realities of the free market, which include international
trade and investment liberalisation and an increase in the significance and
69. See WTO Factsheet 4, available at http://bitd.metco.net/policy-factsheets/wto4.html
(last visited Sept. 2003).
70. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. III [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
71. See Canute James, Caribbean Basin - Strength lies in regional alliance, FIN. TIMES,
Sept 20, 2000, available at http://specials.ft.com/worldeconomy2000/FT30Q5
UPBDC.html (last visited Sept. 2003).
72. NAFTA, supra note 56, ch. 11, art. 1403(4).
73. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
113, 33 I.C.M. 1168 (1994), art. 11 [hereinafter GATS].
74. Second Draft Agreement, Chapter on Investment, available at http://ftaa-alca.org/
ftaadraft02/eng/ngine-l.asp.
CARIBCARICOM FRAMEWORK
importance of the WTO regime, will have an even more significant im-
pact on the Member States of CARICOM when the FTAA and the
GATS are realised.
Although the trade and investment objectives of CARICOM are simi-
lar, albeit on a smaller scale, to those under the FTAA, the maintenance
and strengthening of CARICOM, especially in its capacity as a quazi-
political union, is critical. Within the FTAA, CARICOM, not to mention
the individual countries within CARICOM, will represent a minority
trade and investments party. In the absence of an unlikely Federation of
CARICOM states, each Caribbean country will enter into the FFAA as a
contracting party in its own right. However, should individual countries
enter into FTAA negotiations on a national rather than a regional basis
the viability of CARICOM and the sustainable development of the Car-
ibbean region will be threatened.
In the case of NAFTA, Mexico was the minority contracting party.
Mexico, without sufficient foresight and preparedness perhaps, embraced
a close and 'partnership-like' trade and investments relationship with the
United States and Canada; unfortunately, many commentators believe
that it conceded the most and paid the greatest price in NAFTA negotia-
tions.75 Although CARICOM is not a political union, per se, it is impera-
tive that negotiations within and without the FTAA recognise
CARICOM as a representative institution; otherwise the fate of Mexico
and worse will be the inevitable result for individual Caribbean countries
in FTAA and other external trade and investments negotiations.
The Caribbean countries are developing countries, none of which is fi-
nancially or otherwise able, by itself, to establish and maintain a satisfac-
tory negotiating machinery. Through a regional framework, however, the
capacity to establish and maintain a representative negotiating machinery
is enhanced. Within CARICOM, the RNM has been established and will
advise CARICOM members in international trade and investments nego-
tiations. Although the RNM was not established to further a political
union, representative negotiations through it indicate if not require the
existence of a quazi-political union.
D. GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION
Globalisation represents the growing economic interdependence
among countries in the area of trade and investments. It is an evolving
process, which is reflected in the development of integrated global mar-
kets in a variety of goods and services. 76 Although regional initiatives,
such as the CSME, involve the development of an integrated market in
goods and services, stricto senso, regional initiatives, which are by nature
limited in their territorial reach, do not represent a global market.
75. See NORTON, supra note 60, at 269.
76. See Govidarajan & Gupta, supra note 6.
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The trade and investments arrangements that are developed and ap-
plied under regional initiatives often betray reliance on extra-regional
trade usage and practice. Consequently, the integrated market in goods
and services within regional trade arrangements represent globalisation
at a micro-level. At a macro-level, the WTO regime could be considered
a component of globalisation. However, at present, the WTO regime is
unpredictable in some areas and unsettled in others; thus, even the WTO
regime would not qualify, stricto senso, as a global arrangement.7 7
Although no global market exists in the sense of a single institutional
arrangement, particular trade and investment practices have global reach
and are of international significance. In the area of financial services,
some commentators argue that from the point of view of the world's
more substantial capital users and investors, a global market in financial
products has already been realised. 78 Insofar as the commonwealth Car-
ibbean is concerned, it is of particular significance that the dominant fi-
nancial institutions are multi-national banks. In Jamaica, for example,
Canadian banks are dominant and the financial sector is greatly influ-
enced by Canadian financial practices. In general, the financial institu-
tions within CARICOM are influenced by global trends and maintain an
international trade in cross-border flows of financial products and ser-
vices, capital, and know-how.
Multi-national banks impact local business in two ways. First, the busi-
ness conduct of multi-national banks reflects the international scope of
their operations. Second, the complexity of international financial trans-
actions has introduced new linkages and interdependencies between mar-
kets and institutions that could transmit problems and disruptions
between places and institutions almost instantaneously. 79 In short, the
business conduct of multi-national banks represents globalisation in prac-
tice; thus, CARICOM must represent a preparedness to understand and
adequately respond to the evolving realities of globalisation.
International Standardisation is a necessary corollary to international
trade liberalisation and globalisation. The international standards setting
process assumes that international trade and investments require predict-
ability and efficiency. Weights and measures are of ancient vintage and it
is not surprising, therefore, that they represent the most time honoured
and acceptable international standards. Insofar as trade in goods and ser-
vices is concerned, a number of international institutions and other enti-
ties, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), International
Organisation of Securities Commissioners (IOSC), International Ac-
counting Standards Committee (IAIS), and the Basle Committee on
77. WTO Agreement, supra note 70, at preamble (they recognize the need to develop,
not maintain, an integrated multilateral trading system).
78. See SAMUEL L. HAYES III & PHILIP M. HUBBARD, INVESTMENT BANKING: A
TALE OF THREE CITIES 339 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press1990).
79. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Challenges Facing the International Community of Bank
Supervisors, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK QUARTERLY REVIEW
(Autumn 1992).
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Banking Supervision have been established, each with a clear objective to
achieve some degree of international standardisation. Thus, they have
sought to standardise accounting and financial regulations, customs, and
tariffs and the manner in which service providers are treated when they
invest outside of their own jurisdictions.
The international standards setting process involves myriad political,
socio-historical, and economic considerations. Although the term 'inter-
national' suggests a global consensus, invariably international standards
are established by and for the primary benefit of developed countries. In
some instances, developing countries voluntarily adopt international stan-
dards, in other instances however, those standards are directly or indi-
rectly imposed on them.
In the area of banking supervision, for example, most persons would
accept that banks and other financial institutions should be subject to ap-
propriate regulatory and supervisory standards. Arguably, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision has developed a commendable capi-
tal adequacy framework for the regulation of banks; unfortunately, the
capital adequacy framework was developed without the input of develop-
ing countries and may not be appropriate for their needs. Notwithstand-
ing the limitations of the Basle framework, implementing the standards
established under it may become a pre-condition to financial support
from the IMF and the World Bank.80
Although privatisation and liberalisation are not usually considered as
international standards, in reality privatisation and liberalisation re-
present a pervasive instance of international standardisation. The IMF
and the World Bank, among other international institutions, espouse the
virtues of privatisation and liberalisation. Further, since the 1980s
privatisation and liberalisation have represented their dominant develop-
ment thinking; thus, IMF and World Bank borrower members are 'en-
couraged' to privatise state-owned entities and liberalise their
economies.81
Privatisation of state-owned entities and liberalisation of their econo-
mies have had a significant impact on the countries of the commonwealth
Caribbean. In the case of Jamaica, for example, privatisation and liberal-
isation of the financial sector was actively pursued, with the 'encourage-
ment' of the IMF and the World Bank, during the 1980s and 1990s. A
detailed examination of the privatisation and liberalisation of the Jamai-
can financial sector and the consequences of that process are beyond the
scope of this article. In short, subsequent to its privatisation and liberal-
isation, the Jamaican financial sector suffered a financial crisis. On the
80. See Andrew Cornford, The Basel Committee's Proposals for Revised Capital Ade-
quacy Standards: Mark 2 and the State of Play, UNCTAD Discussion Paper No.
156, Sept. 2001, available at http://r0.unctad.org/en/pub/a156-01.en.htm (last visited
Sept. 2003).
81. See Economic Overview, The Jamaican Economy, Fiscal Year 1 April 2001 - 31
March 2002, available at http://www.emjamusa.org/economy.htm (last visited Sept.
2003).
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evidence, the privatisation and liberalisation of the Jamaican financial
sector was ill-timed, if not ill-advised. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the sequence of financial sector liberalisation has been identified as one
of the fundamental causes of the Jamaican financial sector crisis of the
1990s. 82
International standardisation, like globalisation, will continue to have a
significant impact on the sustainable development of CARICOM. As in-
dividual countries, the members of CARICOM have had little impact on
globalisation and international standardisation. This means that the
global framework which promotes the international trade in goods and
services has been developed and maintained without any real input from
CARICOM Member States. The CARICOM framework allows Member
States an opportunity to maintain a critical presence in the global market;
through the framework, member concerns can be represented to the in-
ternational community and they will be able to have a more meaningful
impact on international trade and investments arrangements.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The recommendations here may not be novel; however, they require
continued emphasis and the political directorate in CARICOM must in-
dicate a demonstrable and unequivocal commitment to implement apace
those recommendations that can withstand the rigors of academic and
practical evaluation. CARICOM should not become an inward looking
initiative; however, it is imperative that it solicits and involves the will of
the Caribbean people. Thus, although the experience of other regional
integration initiatives can be instructive, local circumstances are para-
mount and they should inform the scope and direction of CARICOM.
B. OECS MODEL
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a sub-regional
integration initiative within CARICOM, provides an invaluable reference
model for CARICOM. Although CARICOM was established before the
OECS, and it involves a potentially more viable integration initiative, the
OECS is more accomplished. Indeed, the OECS model is an invaluable
reference model not only for CARICOM but also for other regional inte-
gration initiatives.
The OECS was established in 1981 under the Treaty of Basseterre. It
developed out of the West Indies States Council of Ministers (WISA),
which was established in 1966 to administer common services among par-
ticipating territories and the Eastern Caribbean Common Market
(ECCM), which was established in 1968 to promote harmonious and eq-
82. See Historical Background to the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FIN-
SAC), Annual Report 1998, available at http://www.finsac.com/AboutFinsacHist
Background.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
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uitable development of the Eastern Caribbean sub-region. The Treaty of
Basseterre provides for the cooperation among Member States at the re-
gional and international level, for the economic integration of Member
States, and for the harmonisation of foreign policy. 83
The OECS is administered by a Central Secretariat and its institutions
include the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL),
the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA), the Eastern Caribbean Central
Bank (ECCB), and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC). The
OECS framework also includes a legal unit, which provides support to
OECS members, the Secretariat, and subsidiary institutions. The legal
unit focuses on questions of law reform and legislative harmonisation,
coordination of judicial reform, trade negotiations, and the provision of
routine legal services.8 4
The various institutions within the OECS have been developed and
maintained in a manner that would facilitate the establishment of the
OECS Single Market (OSM). The question of monetary policy, for ex-
ample, is more or less settled; the ECCB serves as the monetary authority
for the sub-region and there is a unified currency in the Eastern Carib-
bean (EC) Dollar. The OECS also maintains joint diplomatic representa-
tion in Brussels and Ottawa and it is an associate member of CARICOM.
Notwithstanding the CARICOM integration initiative, the OECS has
sought to deepen its own integration, and in 1991, the OECS Heads of
Government agreed upon the creation of the OSM.8 5
CARICOM should carefully analyse the OECS model and take from it
those aspects which are beneficial. In particular, CARICOM could
hasten to implement a regional central bank similar to the ECCB as well
as a unified currency. The logistics of implementing a CARICOM central
bank and a unified currency pose different and perhaps greater difficul-
ties than would have been encountered by the OECS when those mea-
sures were implemented. Notwithstanding the implementation
difficulties that could arise, those measures, which have been considered
by CARICOM, could have a significant beneficial effect and every effort
should be made to implement them.
C. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HARMONISATION
Legislative and regulatory harmonisation involves a complex matrix of
legislative, regulatory, and policy considerations. Insofar as trade and in-
vestments are concerned, the objective of harmonisation is the creation of
an enabling and non-discriminatory environment for market participants.
Ultimately, legislative and regulatory harmonisation in a common market
should involve a systemic consideration and possibly an overhaul of the
broad spectrum of legislation and regulations.
83. See The O.E.C.S., available at http://www.caribisles.org/caribbean/count-09.htm
(last visited Sept. 2003).
84. See OECS Web page, at http://www.oecs.org.
85. Id.
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A systemic consideration and overhaul of the legislative and regulatory
regimes in CARICOM would be intrusive and it could offend the politi-
cal sensitivities of individual jurisdictions. However, trade and invest-
ments legislation and regulations do not exist in a vacuum; they require
the overall existence of a favourable constitutional and legislative envi-
ronment. 86 Although the nature and extent of harmonisation can only be
determined after a complete analysis of the local circumstances, without
more, the establishment and maintenance of an enabling trade and in-
vestments environment should involve a consideration and possible over-
haul of the monetary and fiscal regimes.
Monetary harmonisation infers a commitment to agree upon and im-
plement a legislative and regulatory regime for the maintenance of a sta-
ble and predictable financial services sector. Insofar as fiscal
harmonisation is concerned CARICOM requires the establishment and
maintenance of a common taxation and customs regime. Although the
countries of the commonwealth Caribbean have shared socio-historical
realities, monetary and fiscal policy in each country is usually within the
protectionist domain of the political directorate; thus, harmonisation is
difficult to achieve. 87
An analysis of the monetary and fiscal regimes in CARICOM indicates
significant, though not insurmountable, policy and implementation dis-
tinctions. Those distinctions mean that trans-national CARICOM enti-
ties have to contend with what are effectively non-tariff trade barriers
within the CSME. Those distinctions have had a negative impact on in-
tra-regional business and are a hindrance to economic integration within
the CSME. 88
D. TRAINING AND COLLABORATION PROGRAMMES
Economic integration involves an evolving matrix of domestic, re-
gional, and global considerations. In the absence of a political federation,
policy and implementation is within the political domain of individual
countries. Notwithstanding this limitation within a common economic
area, it is imperative that the technical and other intellectual considera-
tions that guide policy and implementation, are developed through col-
laborative programmes by individuals who are adequately trained.
1. Regional Expertise
Adequate training is a pre-requisite for expertise. In the area of finan-
cial services, for example, effective regulation and supervision of the fi-
86. See Jeswald Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Coun-
tries, 15 ICSID Review, FOREICiN INVESTMENT L.J. 382-416 (2000).
87. The situation in CARICOM is not unique; indeed, within the Euro zone the ques-
tion of monetary and fiscal harmonisation has been one of the most controversial
areas and the UK and Sweden, for example, have demonstrated an un-prepared-
ness to concede authority to the EC on that question.
88. Mohammed, supra note 57.
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nancial sector requires adequately trained supervisors who understand
the risks inherent in financial activities. It also requires the existence of a
cadre of technocrats who can formulate and advise on the establishment
and maintenance of an adequate framework of regulation and supervi-
sion. 89 Clearly, the financial sector is but one, albeit a critical, component
in a regional economic area. As with the financial sector, every other
component requires expertise.
Collaboration between academia and government could be the most
cost effective method for the development of policy initiatives and re-
gional expertise in the area of international trade and investments. Col-
laboration can involve academia at all levels; however, it is likely to
produce the best results if it includes postgraduate research at the highest
level. The principal academic institution in the commonwealth Carib-
bean is the University of the West Indies (UWI). It has a commendable
record in academic training and it is party to an initiative with CAR-
ICOM that examines the impact of Caribbean integration. 90 Notwith-
standing the existence of the CARICOM I UWI initiative, the level of
collaboration between academia and CARICOM is inadequate.
International trade and investments involve myriad economic, political
and socio-historical considerations; however, the framework within which
they are conducted is law based. Consequently, the establishment and
maintenance of an enabling environment for international trade and in-
vestments require a sound understanding of the legal principles that di-
rect them. The UWI was established as a regional institution and its
mandate, express or implied, requires it to prepare the region for the
challenges of international trade and investments. Consequently, given
the importance of law in the areas of international trade and investments,
it is imperative that it develops and maintains an appropriate postgradu-
ate law programme in those areas.
Although the role of the UWI is critical, in the absence of increased
support for and reliance on its academic research by regional govern-
ments and institutions, it will be unable to fulfil its mandate. Regional
governments should commission and support the establishment of a
CARICOM Education Unit (CEU), within the UWI, which would be
dedicated to postgraduate research in the areas of trade, investments, in-
tegration, and diplomacy. They should also commit themselves to a pro-
gramme of reliance on those initiatives, developed through it, which can
withstand the rigors of academic and practical evaluation.
2. Trade and Investment Collaboration
Although the FFAA represents a hemispheric trade and investments
initiative, the countries of CARICOM still require a Caribbean commit-
89. See Bank for International Settlements Web page, at http://www.bis.org/fsi/about/
fsi.htm (last visited Sept. 2003).
90. See Background to the Project, available at http://www.caricom.org (last visited
Sept. 2003).
2004]
60 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
ment on questions of trade, investments, integration, and diplomacy.
Within the FTAA, CARICOM will represent a minority interest; thus,
unless CARICOM is represented as a united force within it the interest of
individual commonwealth Caribbean countries could be under-repre-
sented. Without the FTAA, CARICOM or its individual members will
enter into trade and investments relationships that could be incompatible
with, though not objectionable to, the objectives of the FTAA; in those
circumstances, CARICOM would not benefit from the FTAA machinery.
In any event, the FTAA is not a political union and it is not established,
per se, to serve the interest of integration within CARICOM; conse-
quently, the sustainable economic development of CARICOM cannot
rely on it.91
In sum, the sustainable economic development of CARICOM requires
unequivocal political support and a common purpose. This would be fur-
thered by the establishment of joint diplomatic missions, the promotion
of regional integration through cultural expression, the deepening in-
volvement of the RNM in external and internal negotiations, and the es-
tablishment of a CARICOM Development and Integration Forum
(CDIF). Joint diplomatic and trade representation would enable econo-
mies of scope and scale in external relations. Although joint representa-
tion would involve a concession of political authority, this is imperative to
the interest of CARICOM and the sustainable economic development of
individual countries in the commonwealth Caribbean.
3. The CDIF
The CDIF would involve the propagation of intellectual thought; not-
withstanding the apparent overlap with the proposed CEU, it would per-
form a distinct, though ancillary, role. It would include a cadre of
interdisciplinary professionals who are dedicated to the growth and de-
velopment of CARICOM from a practitioner's perspective. They would
be required to assess the practical impact of regional initiatives and the
benefit of academic research; consequently, they would provide an inte-
gral link between government, academia, and the private sector. Ideally
the CDIF would be sponsored and regulated by CARICOM.
Regulation infers the maintenance of appropriate minimum standards
and a transparent and reliable system of accreditation. Through the
CDIF, CARICOM could emphasise trade and investments consultancy as
a specialist discipline; thus, accredited members would be required to sat-
isfy CARICOM that they are of the requisite standard to serve as consul-
tants. Although accreditation, without more, would not enable a more
viable trade and investments environment, it could enhance the quality of
representation available to the private and public sectors in those areas.
91. On the question of banana, for example, CARICOM trade with the UK is signifi-
cant. Unfortunately, banana is not a major concern for the US; thus, in the ab-
sence of vigorous representation by CARICOM its interest in the banana trade
may receive inadequate representation under an FTAA regime.
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The private sector, in particular, should welcome an accreditation mecha-
nism as it would enable entrepreneurs to repose greater confidence in the
advice received from trade and investments consultants.
The mandate of the RNM could be broadened to incorporate the
objectives of the CDIF; however, it is imperative that the CDIF maintains
a broad, private sector driven mandate. At present, the RNM is a perma-
nent institution within CARICOM. The CDIF, on the other hand, should
be no more than a corollary to CARICOM and its membership, though
regulated by CARICOM, should not be subject to its political dictates;
thus, the CDIF would be incompatible with the RNM and it would re-
quire an independent operational structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
CARICOM is a quazi-political, economic integration initiative. It rep-
resents and has been shaped by the socio-historical, political, and eco-
nomic realities of the Caribbean. It is an ongoing initiative and in recent
years the realities of globalisation, international standardisation, and in-
ternational trade and investments arrangements have had a significant
impact on it. There are several challenges to Caribbean integration
within the CARICOM framework; however, integration also presents
several opportunities for the Caribbean region.
The principal challenge to CARICOM is the un-preparedness of the
political directorate to recognise it as a political / quazi-political union.
CARICOM is a very significant initiative for the sustainable economic
development of the Caribbean region; however, the lingering and impor-
tant questions of legislative and regulatory harmonisation, the establish-
ment and maintenance of a monetary union and a single currency, the
establishment and maintenance of joint diplomatic missions, the free
movement of labour, and coordination of fiscal policy require unequivo-
cal political commitment and support. CARICOM must resolve those
questions apace and resolution requires an unequivocal concession of po-
litical authority by regional governments.
Insofar as the CSME is concerned, it requires a predictable trade and
investments environment and disputes settlement mechanism. The sev-
eral protocols that developed in furtherance of the CSME should result in
an enabling trade and investments environment. Further, the CCJ in its
original jurisdiction should provide an appropriate mechanism for the set-
tlement of CSME disputes. It appears, however, that the concept of a
single economy has either been misunderstood or there is a deliberate
effort to mislead when it is argued that CARICOM will not involve a
political union.
A single market, as distinct from a common market, infers the absence
of trade and investments barriers, and within it participants have free and
unlimited access. Consequently, fiscal and monetary policy, common citi-
zenship, and a supra-regional legislative and regulatory regime would be
required. The CHG has the capacity to serve as a supra-regional political
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authority and it is possible that as CARICOM develops it will eventually
assume that role. However, unless that supra-regional political role is
performed the idea of a single economy would be stillborn.
Although there is no global market, in the sense of a single institutional
arrangement, the realities of international trade and investments require
CARICOM to participate in an environment that is increasingly influ-
enced by the challenges of globalisation and international standardisa-
tion. Within this global arrangement small developing states, such as the
countries of the commonwealth Caribbean, are particularly vulnerable.
Alone they have little impact on the process of globalisation and interna-
tional standardisation; hence, their best interest is served through repre-
sentative regional frameworks.
CARICOM has been established for the benefit of the Caribbean re-
gion, especially in the area of external trade and investments negotia-
tions. The RNM, for example, has been developed as a permanent
institution within CARICOM, and it advises the region and negotiates on
its behalf with external entities. The opportunity exists within CAR-
ICOM for the deepening involvement of the RNM in internal and exter-
nal affairs and for the establishment of a regional forum (CDIF), which
would enhance the value of regional trade and investments consultants.
Although CARICOM is a Caribbean initiative, it should not be insular
or inward looking because the experiences of other regional initiatives
can be instructive. Within CARICOM, however, a sub-regional initiative
- the OECS - exists and it represents a substantial integration model
from which the CARICOM framework could benefit. In it lies an oppor-
tunity for academic and practical Caribbean evaluation and the model
should be relied upon in instances where its benefits are undeniable.
In sum, the CARICOM framework is a regional integration initiative
which has been developed in response to the socio-historical, economic,
and political realities of the Caribbean. Those realities include the legacy
of colonialism, the impact of globalisation and international standardisa-
tion, and the increasing significance of extra-regional integration initia-
tives. CARICOM represents several opportunities for the benefit of the
region; however, there are several challenges and its growth and develop-
ment require the unequivocal commitment and support of the political
directorate.
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